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BOOK REVIEW
JUSTICE TRIAGE
Reviewing BENJAMIN H. BARTON & STEPHANOS BIBAS, REBOOTING
JUSTICE: MORE TECHNOLOGY, FEWER LAWYERS, AND THE FUTURE OF
LAW (2017).

Milan Markovic*
INTRODUCTION
By any measure, the United States is suffering from a crisis
involving lack of access to justice.1 Low and middle-income Americans are often forced to navigate the civil legal system on their own,
including when they face serious penalties such as eviction and wage
garnishment.2 Indigent criminal defendants are nominally better off

*
Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law. I would like to
thank Susan Fortney, Jim Greiner, and Frank Pasquale for their insights in
connection with this Book Review.
1
The Legal Services Corporation’s meta-analysis of existing research finds
that less than one in five legal needs nationwide is resolved with the help of an attorney. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA 1
(2009),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/marketresearch/
PublicDocuments/JusticeGaInAmerica2009.authcheckdam.pdf. For a discussion of
the methodology and implications of legal needs research, see Milan Markovic,
Juking Access to Justice to Deregulate the Legal Market, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
63, 69-72 (2016) [hereinafter Juking Access to Justice].
2
See, e.g., HELAINE M. BARNETT, TASK FORCE TO EXPAND ACCESS TO CIVIL
LEGAL SERVS. IN N.Y., REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
1-2 (2013), http://www.nycourts.gov/accesstojusticecommission/PDF/CLS-Task
ForceReport_2013.pdf (reporting that ninety-eight percent of tenants in eviction
cases, ninety-nine percent of borrowers in consumer credit cases, and ninety-five
percent of parents in child support cases appear pro se).
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because of the Constitutional right to appointed counsel,3 but counsel
need not be competent to satisfy the Sixth Amendment standard.4
These problems are not new, and the American legal profession has sought to address them in various ways, from advocating for
increased funding for civil legal aid and indigent defense, to encouraging attorneys to provide pro bono services.5 Unfortunately, the
number of Americans who lack representation continues to grow. 6
In recent years, prominent scholars have advocated for fundamentally rethinking how legal services are delivered to alleviate the
current lack of access to justice.7 These scholars argue that the legal
profession’s monopoly over the legal services market has priced low
and middle-income Americans out of the legal market,8 and that only
by deregulating the market would more Americans of modest means
be able to readily access legal services.

3

See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that the Constitution provides for a right to counsel for indigent criminal defendants).
4
See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and
Resistance After Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2154 (2013) (claiming that post-Gideon, “[t]he Supreme Court has refused to require competent representation, instead adopting a standard of ‘effective counsel’ that hides and perpetuates deficient representation.”); Michael J. Mannheimer, Gideon, Miranda, and the
Downside to Incorporation, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 401, 428 (2015) (“The quality
of counsel under the [Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence] is so spotty that many defendants would be at least as well off—and some would be better
off—if Gideon had never been decided.”).
5
See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice,
42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 869, 892-911 (2009) (identifying expanding the right to
counsel and increasing pro bono commitments as common proposals for access to
justice reform).
6
See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 1, at 25-26.
7
See, e.g., GILLIAN HADFIELD, RULES FOR A FLAT WORLD: WHY HUMANS
INVENTED LAW AND HOW TO REINVENT IT FOR A COMPLEX GLOBAL ECONOMY 1
(2017); Alice Woolley & Trevor Farrow, Addressing Access to Justice through
New Legal Service Providers: Opportunities and Challenges, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV.
549, 550-51 (2016); Laurel A. Rigertas, The Legal Profession’s Monopoly: Failing
to Protect Consumers, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2683, 2683-84 (2014).
8
See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, The Cost of Law: Promoting Access to Justice
Through the (Un)Corporate Practice of Law, 38 INT’L REV. L. & ECON., 43, 43
(2014); George C. Harris & Derek F. Foran, The Ethics of Middle Class Access to
Legal Services and What We Can Learn from the Medical Profession’s Shift to a
Corporate Paradigm, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 775, 775-78 (2001).
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Benjamin Barton and Stephanos Bibas’s new book, Rebooting
Justice: More Technology, Fewer Lawyers, and the Future of Law, is
an eloquent exemplar of the deregulation literature. What sets Rebooting Justice apart from other works in the genre is that Barton and
Bibas do not treat deregulation as a panacea. Their starting point is
that Americans are not well served by lawyers’ monopoly over the
legal services market, but they do not envision a world in which every legal problem is resolved ably and efficiently. Their goal is much
more modest: a less complex legal system in which lawyer assistance
is not as vital, and public resources are used primarily to improve the
quality of felony defense.9
Part I of this Review examines Rebooting Justice’s unabashed
call for triaging Americans’ legal needs. The authors vividly illustrate
that legal needs cannot be addressed by merely seeking to expand access to lawyers. Barton and Bibas question shibboleths such as that
every legal need requires attorney intervention and that attorney assistance is always beneficial. Barton and Bibas conceive of different
levels of service based on a legal need’s complexity and significance.
They contend that our legal system can be simplified and that judges
should do more to assist the unrepresented.
Rebooting Justice is also optimistic that information technology can expand access to justice. Although technology can certainly
help to mitigate the justice gap, Part II observes that just as lawyers
and judges have consciously or unconsciously sought to maintain the
legal system’s complexity, legal technology companies and alternative legal service providers may stand in the way of simplification
and common sense reforms of the legal system.
As set out in Part III, Rebooting Justice may also misdiagnose
lack of access to justice by viewing the problem largely as a function
of the high cost of legal services and overregulation. People do not
seek out legal assistance for a number of reasons, and complex social
and cultural barriers deter people from even considering obtaining legal assistance. There is also more variance in regulatory structures in
the United States than Barton and Bibas acknowledge, and jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom that have liberalized their legal
markets have thus far not seen the access gains that some commentators expected.
9
See, e.g., BARTON & BIBAS at 7-8. For a discussion of their treatment of criminal misdemeanor cases, see infra Part I.
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Rebooting Justice is likely to be uncomfortable reading for
anyone who believes that justice should never be rationed. But in a
time when the political branches are endeavoring to eviscerate public
funding for legal services, 10 Barton and Bibas offer a compelling
blueprint to protect the rights of low and middle-income Americans.
Any credible plan to expand access to justice must grapple seriously
with their call for justice triage.
I. MORE LAWYERS? MORE JUSTICE?
The legal profession’s strategy to expand access to justice has
been to seek to provide Americans with lawyers in more situations.11
As Rebooting Justice recounts, this approach has predominately
failed. Most Americans address their civil justice problems on their
own, and pro se litigants are overwhelming many courts. 12 Criminal
defendants are theoretically better off because of Gideon13 and its
progeny, but the representation that they receive is too often deficient. Courts have upheld convictions where defense counsel were,
inter alia, asleep, drunk, or disbarred.14
Political liberals and conservatives naturally differ on whether
these problems can and should be addressed by increasing public
funding for legal services. However, for Barton and Bibas, this debate distracts from the sheer scale of Americans’ lack of access to
justice.

10

The Trump administration has proposed abolishing the Legal Services Corporation that provides the majority of funding for legal aid. See Debra C.
Weiss, Trump Budget Eliminates Legal Services Corp. Funding, ABA J. (Mar. 16,
2017, 8:45 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/trump_budget_eliminates
funding_for_legal_services_corp/.
11
See Stephanos Bibas, Shrinking Gideon & Expanding Alternatives to Lawyers, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1287, 1288 (2013) (“The standard response of academics has been to lament [lack of access to justice] and to call for a new law or
more aggressive litigation and Constitutional challenges.”).
12
See supra text accompanying note 2.
13
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
14
See BARTON & BIBAS, at 18; see also Bibas, supra note 11, at 1288 (“While
in theory the Sixth Amendment requires that counsel be minimally effective, in
practice it does not. . . any lawyer with a pulse will be deemed effective.”) (citation
omitted).
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We cannot untie the Gordian knot by adding more
strands of rope; we need to cut it, to simplify it . . . .
The real world of legal problems looks like an emergency room, with too many patients and too little time
and money. We need to do triage, to narrow our ambitions, to focus on cases that are the most complex,
most serious, and most meritorious. Where lawyers
are truly indispensable . . . we need to focus our funding, to make lawyers meaningful in practice. . . .
Where the stakes are lower or the issues are simpler,
Americans need simpler, cheaper alternatives to giving everyone a free lawyer. 15
The notion of triage may be an anathema in a country dedicated to “equal justice under the law,” but Americans’ legal needs are
already being triaged, albeit in a desultory manner.16 Legal aid offices
turn away over one million cases a year and are restricted from offering certain services.17 Public defender offices are notoriously overworked and have been forced to use litigation to lower their caseloads
so that they do not provide deficient representation.18
Barton and Bibas advance their call for triage by drawing on
nascent empirical research that questions the value of lawyers in less
complex proceedings.19 Kritzer’s review of Wisconsin administrative
proceedings finds that lawyers and nonlawyer representatives perform similarly, with the determinative factor being experience with
the proceeding in question. 20 In addition, an oft-cited randomized
15

BARTON & BIBAS, at 7-8.
See id. at 182 (“We live in a world of finite resources, so some level of triage is not only likely, but inevitable. The question is whether we want to handle
triage rationally and openly, or to back into a system that spreads out resources
without any plan or purpose.”).
17
See Rebekah Diller & Emily Savner, Restoring Legal Aid for the Poor: A
Call to End Draconian and Wasteful Restrictions, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 687, 688
(2009).
18
See Peter A. Joy, Rationing Justice by Rationing Lawyers, 37 WASH. U. J.L.
& POL’Y 205, 220-22 (2001) (detailing efforts to remedy excessive caseloads
among Missouri public defender offices).
19
BARTON & BIBAS, at 104-07.
20
Id. at 152 (“The presence or absence of legal training is less important than
substantial experience with the setting.” (citing Herbert M. Kritzer, LEGAL
ADVOCACY: LAWYERS AND NONLAWYERS AT WORK 201 (1998))).
16
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control study of unemployment appeal cases by Greiner and Pattanayak concludes that legal representation extends the duration of cases by forty percent, but fails to produce better outcomes. 21 Although
the implications of this research remain controversial, 22 in few settings has the value of lawyer assistance been tested rigorously.23
Barton and Bibas do not specify which types of matters merit
the involvement of attorneys aside from felony cases. 24 But they are
skeptical that existing resources are being used optimally. Whereas
most commentators have lauded the Supreme Court’s expansion of
the right of counsel post-Gideon,25 Barton and Bibas posit that there
is a tradeoff in a world of finite resources between providing lawyers
in a greater number of settings, and the quality of representation that
defendants will receive. 26 Extending the right to counsel to more
types of criminal cases in their view has “leeched resources from felony cases and generally watered down expectations for the entire sys-

21

See id. at 108 (citing James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance: What Difference Does Representation
(Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118, 2154 (2012)).
22
See Russell Engler, Turner v. Rogers and the Role of the Courts in Delivering Access to Justice, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 31, 52 (2013) (noting that variables such as “the judge, the court’s procedures, the pool of cases, the lawyering
strategies, and the nature and extent of the assistance . . .” might also impact case
outcomes).
23
See Leslie Levin, The Monopoly Myth and Other Tales About the Superiority if Lawyers, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2611, 2617-18 (2014) (noting that claims regarding the efficacy of attorneys are based predominately on nonrandom observational studies).
24
BARTON & BIBAS, at 104 (noting that felony cases are procedurally complex
and entail the highest stakes).
25
See, e.g., John D. King, Beyond “Life and Liberty”: The Evolving Right to
Counsel, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 45-46 (2013); John Gross, The True Benefits of Counsel: Why Do-It-Yourself Lawyering Does Not Protect the Rights of the
Indigent, 43 N.M. L. REV. 1, 33 (2013) (“The Supreme Court has been conscious
of the financial burden placed upon the states by their decisions to extend the right
to counsel. Nevertheless, the Court felt that the presence of counsel was required
. . . . Whatever the cost, it was money well spent.”).
26
BARTON & BIBAS, at 183-84; see also Erica Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 461, 488 (2007) (“Over the
past twenty-five years, caseloads of indigent defenders have borne the brunt of the
rise in the number of cases requiring court-appointed counsel. As a result of these
increases, per-lawyer caseloads in many jurisdictions now radically exceed accepted standards.”).
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tem.”27 To forsake the rights and interests of criminal misdemeanor
defendants in order to better protect those of felony defendants may
strike some readers as a false dichotomy, but empirical research suggests that the right to counsel has not only been “watered down” but
is at times illusory. Jurisdictions regularly fail to provide counsel
when constitutionally required to do so.28
Barton and Bibas believe that this experience calls into question the utility of providing public funding for representation in civil
cases (often dubbed “Civil Gideon”).29 Rather, the goal should be to
simplify civil and criminal proceedings so that legal representation is
less necessary.30 The authors highlight that in the early years of the
United States, literate citizens would regularly represent themselves
in courts without the need for legal assistance.31 Their account overlooks that endeavoring to apply the law without lawyers created a
whole host of societal ills during this period and hastened the development of organized state bars.32 But proceedings can undoubtedly be
made simpler without risking the rule of law.
Simplification can take many forms. Some courts already facilitate self-representation by providing pro se litigants with simplified pleading forms, resources to conduct legal research, and access
to designated court staff.33 Alternative dispute resolution, including
online dispute resolution (ODR), allows parties to resolve key issues
outside of court and on a more flexible schedule.34 Large companies
such as eBay and Paypal resolve thousands of small claims disputes

27

BARTON & BIBAS, at 107. The authors take particular issue with Argersinger
v. Hamlin, 207 U.S. 25 (1972) which extended the right to counsel to misdemeanor
cases that could lead to imprisonment. Id. at 40-41.
28
See Erica Hashimoto, Abandoning Misdemeanor Defendants, 25 FED. SENT.
R. 103, 103 (2012) (“The existing data, although incomplete, strongly suggest that
significant percentages of misdemeanor defendants who have a right to counsel
proceed unrepresented.”).
29
BARTON & BIBAS, at 107.
30
Id. at 140-42.
31
Id. at 9.
32
Anton-Hermann Chroust, Legal Profession in Colonial America, 34 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 44, 62 (1958).
33
BARTON & BIBAS, at 143-45.
34
Id. at 156-57.
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between their users every year via ODR, and there is no reason that
the justice system could not do the same with low-level disputes.35
Rebooting Justice also makes a significant contribution to the
access to justice literature by focusing on the ability of judges to
transform criminal and civil proceedings. It maintains that judges
should not act as mere passive observers when presiding over cases
involving pro se litigants, but should instead emulate the inquisitorial
style of civil law judges.36 This proposal is less radical than it may
appear upon first inspection. Judges in cases ranging from small
claims to disability and unemployment benefits appeals routinely relax or do away with evidentiary standards, ask questions of the parties
and witnesses, and conduct the proceedings in such a way that lawyers are not needed.37 These administrative proceedings have received relatively little attention from legal scholars, but participants
may well perceive them as more fair than proceedings that are conducted in a more adversarial manner.
Judges and court staff already labor under significant resource
constraints, and thus may resist efforts to make them more responsible for protecting the rights of pro se parties.38 Moreover, there is also
only so much that judges can do when pro se litigants face adversaries that are represented by highly trained and skilled opposing
counsel.39 But training judges to better manage proceedings with unrepresented parties, without forsaking neutrality, is far more attainable than extending Gideon to the civil realm.40 Some states have already promulgated guidelines that encourage judges to explain the

35

Id. at 114-15.
See id. at 150-51.
37
Id. at 150-52.
38
Id. at 152-54.
39
See Russell G. Pearce, Redressing Inequality in the Market for Justice: Why
Access to Lawyers Will Never Solve the Problem and Why Rethinking the Role of
Judges Will Help, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 969 (2004).
40
See BARTON & BIBAS, at 71-72 (arguing that Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431
(2011) effectively foreclosed Civil Gideon); see also Juking Access to Justice, supra note 1, at 86 ([“A] more feasible and effective alternative than seeking to ensure that every litigant has a representative would be to more closely regulate the
dealings between attorneys and unrepresented individuals and impose additional
obligations on judges.”).
36
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trial process, to clarify elements and claims, and to inquire into
whether settlements are entered into voluntarily. 41
The virtue of these proposals is that they are largely within
the power of lawyers and judges to implement and do not depend on
an infusion of public funding.42 The fact that process simplification
has only begun to gain traction illustrates the degree to which the legal profession has been wedded to expanding access to justice
through access to lawyers without considering whether this is the
most effective way to assist low and middle-income Americans.
II. TECHNO-OPTIMISM
Although Rebooting Justice questions widely-held tenets concerning the value and importance of lawyer assistance,43 it is far more
bullish on legal technology’s potential to expand access to justice.44
Barton and Bibas write:
[T]echnology and new approaches to dispute resolution have led us to the threshold of a new golden age
of access to justice . . . . Amazingly, it is already happening all around us. Because our statutes, regulations,
and court decisions are now online, ordinary Americans have more access to the laws that govern them
than ever before . . . . When LegalZoom and Rocket
Lawyer sell legal documents for a fraction of the price
charged by a lawyer, we all have greater access to law
and legal remedies . . . . Information technology brings
creative destruction to a stodgy field, offering many
new ways of providing legal help cheaply and quickly.45
41
Russell Engler, Ethics in Transition: Unrepresented Litigants and the
Changing Judicial Role, 22 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 367, 377-79
(2008).
42
BARTON & BIBAS, at 180-81.
43
See, e.g., id. at 109 (“[I]ntroducing more lawyers has dynamic effects that
reshape the entire system, making it slower, harder, and more complicated for unrepresented parties to seek justice.”).
44
For an excellent discussion of the discourse of optimism pertaining to access
to justice and legal technology, see David Luban, Optimism, Skepticism, and Access to Justice, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 495, 499-508 (2016).
45
BARTON & BIBAS, at 195.
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As the authors acknowledge, there are, of course, potential
drawbacks to people managing their legal needs via information
technology and without attorney assistance.46 Not everyone is equally
capable of leveraging technology effectively.47 More generally, legal
needs often do not fall into easily identifiable categories,48 and clients’ interests cannot always be reduced to achieving certain predetermined outputs.49 For instance, legal documents created via LegalZoom or Rocket Lawyer may not have their intended effect, and
these companies disclaim warranties on their products.50
Nevertheless, much of Rebooting Justice’s techno-optimism
is warranted, even if information technology does not precipitate a
“golden age of access to justice.” In previous decades, the most basic
of legal tasks may have required consulting with an attorney whereas
now one can fill out a will, start a business, or change one’s name
from the comfort of one’s home.51 As legal technology develops, the

46

Id. at 195-97.
See id. at 117-18. Some research suggests that this problem is not at all confined to elderly individuals. See generally Catrina Denvir et al., Surfing the WebRecreation or Resource? Exploring How Young People in the UK Use the Internet
as an Advice Portal for Problems with a Legal Dimension, 23 INTERACTING WITH
COMPUTERS 96, 99-101 (2011) (reporting that eighteen to twenty-four years olds
were no more likely to use the internet to address legal problems than individuals
over sixty and struggled to find useful, reliable information once on the internet).
48
See Frank Pasquale & Glyn Cashwell, Four Futures of Legal Automation, 63
UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 26, 29 (2015) (warning of a “cookie-cutter, one-sizefits-all” conception of law).
49
Katherine Kruse has argued that lawyers are too often wedded to a conception of clients as “cardboard clients”—one dimensional figures interested only in
maximizing their legal and financial interests.” Katherine Kruse, Beyond Cardboard Clients in Legal Ethics, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 103, 103 (2010).
50
See, e.g., BARTON & BIBAS, at 128-29; Lisa H. Nicholson, Access to Justice
Requires Access to Attorneys: Restrictions on the Practice of Law Serve a Societal
Purpose, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2761, 2768, 2772 (2014); Richard Zorza, Five
Broad New Ideas to Cut through the Access to Justice-CommercializationDeregulation Conundrum, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 683, 692 (2016) (suggesting
aggressive enforcement of consumer protection laws against alternative legal service providers).
51
BARTON & BIBAS, at 124-25.
47
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quality of the products developed by alternative legal service providers like LegalZoom and Rocket Lawyer will presumably improve. 52
Yet Rebooting Justice neglects to consider the possibility that
legal technology companies and alternative legal services providers
might endeavor to tailor the legal system to suit their ends. 53 Barton
and Bibas detail vividly how the legal profession has molded the legal
system to its advantage, but they largely assume that for-profit corporations will work to make the legal system simpler and more accessible.
Rebooting Justice does not reference TurboTax, but this
popular tax software is often lauded as the paradigmatic example of
technology’s ability to replace professional advisors such as lawyers
and accountants.54 There is no doubt that TurboTax has made it easier
for Americans to file their taxes.55 But this has come at a cost. Intuit,
the maker of TurboTax, has lobbied aggressively and effectively to
preserve its control over the tax preparation market.56
See id. at 129 (“LegalZoom may eventually do a volume of business that
will allow it to surpass the quality of any individualized work.”); see also Benjamin
A. Barton, Some Early Thoughts on Liability Standards for Online Providers of
Legal Services, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 542, 555 (2015) (noting that legal documents
drafted via online providers may be imperfect but that lawyers also routinely draft
imperfect documents). Some commentators have also proposed regulating alternative legal services providers. See, e.g., Matthew Longobardi, Note, Unauthorized
Practice of Law and Meaningful Access to Courts: Is Law Too Important to Be Left
to Lawyers, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 2043, 2074 (2014) (“The best option to fully utilize nonlawyers would be to stratify the current legal profession through the use of
a licensing system for nonlawyers.”). Barton and Bibas do not endorse this approach and appear to prefer an alternative regime whereby consumers would have
tort remedies against entities that provide flawed legal advice or documents.
BARTON & BIBAS, at 174.
53
BARTON & BIBAS, at 76 (“No one sat down and deliberately designed the
flawed criminal or civil justice systems . . . . Nevertheless, the unconscious incentives that drive the system are probably more powerful and important than the conscious ones.”).
54
See, e.g., Luban, supra note 43, at 500-01; Raymond Brescia, Uber for Lawyers: The Transformative Potential of a Sharing Economy Approach to the Delivery of Legal Services, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 745, 821-22 (2106).
55
Rodney P. Mock & Nancy E. Schurtz, The TurboTax Defense, 15 FLA. TAX
REV. 443, 532 (2014) (“[L]ow-income taxpayers have also gained with the modernity of free electronic filing and an all-around more convenient, cost effective, and
reliable method to calculate their taxes or refund.”).
56
See id. at 464.
52
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Among other actions, it has endeavored to impose onerous
regulations against tax preparer competitors. It has also sought to
block Americans from filing their taxes by simply reviewing a prefilled government filing. This is how citizens in some European
countries complete their taxes, and the United States could give its
taxpayers the same option. After all, the government already collects
earnings information from employers. 57
There is nothing improper or illegal about Intuit and other
companies pursuing policies that allow them to maximize profits.
However, Barton and Bibas treat lawyers as somehow unique in their
desire to limit competition and to engage in rent-seeking,58 even
though large technology companies are usually better positioned to
advocate for legislation that serves their interests and to stop initiatives that challenge their business models than the more diffuse and
divided legal profession.59
Rebooting Justice’s techno-optimism also obscures that some
effective access to justice reforms can be decidedly low-tech. For example, instead of relying on LegalZoom and other companies to sell
more wills to solve the problem of Americans dying intestate, states

57

See id. at 524; Liz Day, How the Maker of TurboTax Fought Free, Simple
Tax Filing, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 26, 2013), https://www.propublica.org/article/howthe-maker-ofturbotax-fought-free-simple-tax-filing. Intuit’s lobbying efforts were
ultimately unsuccessful in California due in large part to the efforts of a dogged law
professor. See generally Alex Mayyasi, The Stanford Professor Who Fought the
Tax Lobby, PRICEONOMICS (Mar. 22, 2017), https://priceonomics.com/the-stanfordprofessor-who-fought-the-taxlobby (detailing efforts by Intuit to stop California’s
ReadyReturn program).
58
In one memorable passage, Barton and Bibas warn that “vigilance is necessary” in connection with the specter of unauthorized practice of law enforcement.
BARTON & BIBAS, at 137.
59
As one commentator has observed in the context of the internet broadband
industry: “[L]arger companies simply have more resources. They can therefore donate more money, hire more (and better) lobbyists, and spend more on marketing.
Consolidation also imposes discipline and order on the lobbying process . . . .
[W]ell organized and well-resourced interest groups can often secure their interests
better than unorganized and leaderless majorities. Consolidation provides the topdown leadership and coordination that successful lobbying efforts require.” John
Blevins, Death of the Revolution: Legal War on Competitive Broadband Technologies, 12 YALE. J. L. & TECH. 85, 125 (2010).
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could adopt simplified model wills for ordinary citizens to use, as
Michigan and California have done quite successfully.60
An even more ambitious alternative (with respect to wills in
particular) would be to give Americans the option to fill out a testamentary schedule as part of their state tax returns. 61 Integrating wills
into tax returns has several advantages over making them more available over the internet or via alternative legal service providers like
LegalZoom. Americans would be able to complete wills in a standardized form and without the customary formalities at a time when
they are actively considering their finances; they would also be able
to easily update their wills year-to-year.62 These schedules would be
ideal for individuals of modest means who are unlikely to hold complex assets. Because these types of initiatives would lessen the need
for legal services in this area, one suspects that they are likely to be
opposed by both lawyers and alternative legal service providers.
Legal technology holds much promise, but it cannot be assumed that for-profit legal technology companies will always work
towards the public good. Techno-optimism should also not deflect
from the responsibility of policymakers to simplify legal processes
that citizens utilize frequently.
III. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON REGULATION AND COSTS
Despite its nuanced understanding of the challenges Americans face in obtaining quality legal assistance, Rebooting Justice attributes lack of access to justice almost entirely to overregulation.
Because of costly licensing requirements, including the high cost of
legal education, Americans cannot afford legal representation, and
prohibitions on the practice of law by nonlawyers prevent the proliferation of lower cost options in the legal services market.63 To advance access to justice, the legal profession should “get out of the
way” and allow less expensive alternatives to lawyer representation
to develop.64

60

Reid Kress Weisbroad, Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals Opt-Out of
Intestacy, 53 B. C. L. REV. 877, 926 (2012).
61
See id. at 880-81.
62
Id.
63
BARTON & BIBAS, at 67-68.
64
Id. at 8.

14

STANFORD LAW & POLICY REVIEW

[Vol. 29:3

Barton and Bibas are correct that the legal market in the United States, like that of most countries, is heavily regulated.65 However,
it is far from clear that it is the high cost of legal services—driven by
alleged overregulation—that is preventing Americans from obtaining
legal assistance. A recent study by Rebecca Sandefur found that cost
explains the decision to not seek legal assistance in less than a fifth of
civil justice situations.66 According to Sandefur, the two most common reasons why people do not seek help with their legal problems
are that they believe they can either manage them on their own, or
that they believe seeking help would make no difference.67 Other research has come to similar conclusions.68
Lowering the cost of legal services, as Barton and Bibas propose, would undoubtedly benefit low and middle-income people,
even if there are a multitude of factors that prevent them from obtaining legal assistance. However, the authors do not fully substantiate
that the cost of ordinary legal services is especially high in the current
legal market or that overregulation is the cause. 69
To support their claim regarding the high cost of legal services, Barton and Bibas note that the average attorney charges two
hundred dollars an hour.70 However, this figure by itself is not particularly meaningful. For example, the average rate may mask that most
attorneys charge lower rates. Under these circumstances, it should be
relatively easy to find legal help at a lower price point in most jurisdictions. Two hundred dollars an hour may also not be unaffordable if
the legal service in question can be completed in short order. Moreo-

Nuno Garoupa, Globalization and Deregulation of Legal Services, 38 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 77, 84 (2013) (“Legal markets are heavily regulated by the state
in most jurisdictions.”).
66
Rebecca Sandefur, Bridging the Gap: Rethinking Outreach for Greater Access to Justice, 37 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 721, 722-23 (2015) (citations
omitted).
67
Id. at 725-26.
68
See Juking Access to Justice, supra note 1, at 73 (2016) (summarizing statelevel legal needs research).
69
BARTON & BIBAS, at 10.
70
Id. at 24.
65
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ver, some lawyers offer basic legal services on a less costly, flat fee
basis.71
Bibas and Barton undercut their own argument about the high
cost of legal services by noting that LegalZoom and Rocket Lawyer
charge prices for services such as uncontested divorces that are largely in-line with attorneys. 72 For other services, such as bankruptcy filings, the authors note that lawyers may be less expensive.73
Rebooting Justice’s emphasis on high costs in the current
market is also difficult to reconcile with their concession that there is
substantial competition in the legal market; according to Barton and
Bibas, competition has been so fierce that it has shrunk earnings
among solo practitioners by a third over the last few decades.74 This
contention, based on an analysis of sole proprietor tax filings, 75 begs
the question of why more lawyers do not lower their fees in order to

71

See generally Latonia Haney Keith, Poverty, the Great Unequalizer: Improving
the Delivery System for Civil Legal Aid, 66 CATH. U. L. REV. 55, 92 (2016) (“The
flat-fee model offers individuals specified legal services (i.e., limited scope representation) at specific rates . . . . [It] is particularly well suited for modest-means
communities, making legal services generally more accessible.”).
72
Compare BARTON & BIBAS, at 52 (quoting from a Tennessee lawyer’s website that uncontested divorces range in cost from $150-$1500), with BARTON &
BIBAS, at 52 (noting that an uncontested divorce starts at $299 from LegalZoom).
73
Id. at 126 (noting that it may be cheaper to hire a lawyer for bankruptcy than
using LegalZoom or Rocket Lawyer).
74
Id. at 66-67.
75
BARTON & BIBAS, at 55-56. Although beyond the scope of this Review, the
IRS data is unreliable as a means to assess solo practitioners’ incomes. First, the
IRS data includes everyone filing as a sole proprietor who works in the legal services industry regardless of whether he or she is a lawyer. Second, many attorneys’
practices are not organized as sole proprietorships, and for those that are, the attorneys are likely to claim numerous deductions to offset their income and minimize
tax obligations. Third, the IRS filings would include attorneys who report no income or merely practice part-time. See also Michael Simkovic, How Much Do
Lawyers Working in Solo Practice Actually Earn, BRIAN LEITER’S LAW SCHOOL
REPORTS (July 26, 2016), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2016/07/howmuch-do-lawyers-working-in-solopractice-actually-earn-michael-simkovic.html
(raising additional criticisms of use of IRS data by Professor Barton). According to
information collected by the State Bar of Texas, the median full-time solo practitioner earned $105,000 in 2015. STATE BAR OF TEXAS, DEP’T OF RESEARCH AND
ANALYSIS, 2015 INCOME FACT SHEET, 2 (2016), https://www.texasbar.com/AM/
Template.cfm?Section=Demographic_and_Economic_Trends&Template=/CM/
Content Display.cfm&ContentID=34183.
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reach the large percentage of the population that is purportedly priced
out of the market?
One potential answer is that regulation inhibits lawyers from
adopting such models. For example, most lawyers graduate with significant student loan debt and thus are limited in what they can invest
in their legal practices. In addition, in every state other than the District of Columbia, lawyers cannot share profits with nonlawyers, ensuring that law firms cannot raise capital as easily as other businesses
and making it more difficult to invest in technology or mass market
advertising.76
Nevertheless, there is greater variance in regulatory structures
than Rebooting Justice acknowledges. In several states, one can become a lawyer without attending an ABA-accredited law school;
some do not require attending a brick-and-mortar law school at all.77
Nonlawyers routinely practice before federal agencies, and some
states now allow nonlawyer practice in limited areas.78 The notion of
an undifferentiated, completely lawyer-dominated national legal
market that keeps the cost of legal services high is somewhat of a
myth.79
76

See Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big Board? A
Proposal for Nonlawyer Investment in Law firms, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1998);
see also Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services, 73
OHIO ST. L. J. 1, 8 (2012) (“Nonlawyer investors understand that a profit can be realized by offering [legal] services through ‘bulk legal processing capabilities’ rather than through “myriad sole practitioners and small firms across the land.”).
77
Seven jurisdictions permit bar admission applicants to study in a law office
in lieu of attending law school; five jurisdictions permit applicants to study law
through a correspondence course; and six jurisdictions permit applicants to study
law online. Timothy P. Chinaris, We Are Who We Admit: The Need to Harmonize
Law School Admission and Professionalism Processes with Bar Admission Standards, 31 MISS. C. L. REV. 43, 47 n.10 (2012).
78
See Deborah L. Rhode, Professional Integrity and Professional Regulation:
Nonlawyer Practice and Nonlawyer Investment in Law Firms, 39 HASTINGS INT’L
& COMP. L. REV. 111, 113 (2016); see also Brooks Holland, The Washington State
Limited License Legal Technician Practice Rule: A National First in Access to Justice, 82 MISS. L.J. 75, 95 (2013) (describing Washington State’s program of licensing “limited license legal technicians” to practice in family law and other areas).
79
See BARTON & BIBAS, at 179; see also Clifford Winston, Are Law Schools
and Bar Exams Necessary?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/10/25/opinion/are-law-schools-and-bar-examsnecessary.html?_r=1(“For decades the legal industry has operated as a monopoly, which has been made possible
by self-imposed rules and state licensing restrictions.”).
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Fortunately, it is no longer necessary to merely speculate on
the effects of legal market deregulation. The United Kingdom began
allowing corporations, known as alternative business structures
(ABS), to own law firms and offer legal services since 2007.80 Scholars have claimed that well-capitalized ABS would be more innovative than traditional firms, and would also make legal services more
affordable.81 As Barton and Bibas note, deregulation and the rise of
ABS have happily not led to the collapse of the legal system. 82 But
these developments have also not had an appreciable effect on access
to justice.83 One regulator acknowledged recently that “[W]e are . . .
not aware of any strong evidence that ABS provide cheaper legal services and thereby improve access to justice.”84
There are a number of possible explanations for the modest effects of liberalization in the United Kingdom, including that insuffi-

80

Myles V. Lynk, Implications of the UK Legal Services Act 2007 for U.S.
Law Practice and Legal Ethics, 23 PROF. LAW. 26, 34 (2015) (“Alternative business structures are [business entities] that provide “reserved activities” (legal services), in which nonlawyers have an equity ownership investment in the firm and
lawyers and nonlawyers can share in the management and control of the business.”).
81
See, e.g., Ray Worthy Campbell, Rethinking Regulation and Innovation in
the U.S. Legal Services Market, 9 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 1, 3 (2012); BARTON &
BIBAS at 199 (describing innovation by Co-op legal services). Co-op was actually
formed prior to the UK’s deregulatory reforms and has consistently lost money.
Neil Rose, Co-op Legal Services Back in the Black, But Turnover Falls Again,
LEGALFUTURES (Apr. 7, 2016), http:// www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/co-oplegal-services-back-black-turnoverfalls.
82
BARTON & BIBAS, at 199.
83
See Nick Robinson, When Lawyers Don’t Get All the Profits: Nonlawyer
Ownership, Access, and Professionalism, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 15-16
(2016).
84
Stephen Denyer, Rules for a Flat World: The UK Experience,
PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 27, 2017), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/
2017/02/rules-for-a-flat-world-theuk-experience.html. See also Lisa Webley, Legal
Profession (De)Regulation, Equality, and Inclusion, and the Contested Space of
Professionalism within the Legal Market of England and Whales, 83 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2349, 2350 (2015) (“[I]t is unclear if market innovations are prompting greater equality and inclusion for marginalized would-be clients or allowing the state
and the legal profession(s) to evade the fundamental rule of law precept of access to
justice for all.”); Alberto Bernabe, Justice Gap v. Core Values: The Common
Themes in the Innovation Debate, 41 J. LEGAL PROF. 1, 13 (2016) (noting gap between “academic speculation” about ABS versus actual empirical evidence of positive effects).
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cient time has passed to come to any definitive conclusions. Nevertheless, one of the underappreciated aspects of lack of access to justice is that many of the legal services that people most need also happen to be quite labor-intensive.85 Some matters can be dispensed with
after minimal factual and legal investigation, but diligent representation—which Barton and Bibas extol in the felony context—often requires significant investigation for which some individual or entity
must pay. Nor is it clear why investors and firms in a more liberalized
market would seek to focus on populations that are currently underserved when doing so would likely require significant capital outlays
and when they are able to invest in sectors that are already lucrative
and command high margins. Unsurprisingly, in the United Kingdom,
much of the non-lawyer investment has occurred in the personal injury sector.86
Lack of access to justice has proven to be a daunting problem
because complex educational, cultural, and psychological barriers
prevent individuals from seeking legal assistance.87 While Rebooting
Justice does not treat deregulation as a panacea, it is overly focused
on the cost of legal services and regulation as the chief barriers to expanding access.
CONCLUSION
The American legal system has long been failing many low
and middle-income Americans. Rebooting Justice argues persuasively that this problem cannot be solved as long as access to justice is
conceived of as access to lawyers. Barton and Bibas very much accept contemporary political realities, and they propose salutary reforms to benefit Americans of modest means. Some of these re85

The British futurist Richard Susskind describes these types of legal services
as “bespoke.” Courtroom practice is the prototypical example. See RICHARD
SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS 58 (2013).
86
See Judith A. McMorrow, UK Alternative Structures for Leal Practice:
Emerging Models and Lessons for the US, 47 GEO. J. INT’L L. 665, 699-70 (2016)
(“ABS firms have had a huge impact on the personal injury market in the United
Kingdom. By 2014, one-third of personal injury turnover (billings) were from ABS
firms.”).
87
Juking Access to Justice, supra note 1, at 73 (2016); Catherine R. Albiston &
Rebecca Sandefur, Expanding the Empirical Study of Access to Justice, 2013 WISC.
L. REV. L.R 101, 117 (2013) (questioning centrality of the cost of legal services to
lack of access to justice).
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forms—particularly with respect to reforming courts—are quite attainable and are within the legal profession’s power to implement.
Although this Review has questioned some of Rebooting Justice’s optimism towards information technology, as well as its assessment of the causes of lack of access to justice, the current state of
affairs in which too few Americans obtain competent and diligent legal assistance is clearly unsustainable. As Barton and Bibas remind
us, today’s legal market is not solely the domain of lawyers, and
Americans are already using alternatives to lawyers to address legal
problems. The legal profession can ignore this reality and attempt to
preserve the vestiges of its monopoly, or it can endeavor to make the
legal system truly responsive to the needs of low and middle-income
people.

